



Attacking CAPTCHAs for Fun and Profit

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Who Am I

Principal Consultant with Foundstone McAfee

Tools (TesserCap, SSLSmart, and many internal)

Security Research, Web Applications, Networks, Mobile Applications.... and more

Ruby, C#, Rails



Research Scope

Quantcast Top 1 Million

- 200+ CAPTCHA schemes analyzed
- Scores of Websites for Implementation

CAPTCHA Schemes

- Known OCR Engines for Classification
- Custom Image Preprocessing

CAPTCHA Implementations

- Register User Pages
- Recover Account/Password Pages
- Contact Us and Feedback Pages



CAPTCHAs: More Than Just the Image

Client 1

GET /register.php

Server 2

Create a
SESSIONID for
the current
registration
request

4

GET /captcha.php + SESSIONID

 ... /html>

Generate a random CAPTCHA and store in HTTP Session

Return the CAPTCHA

6

POST /verify.php + CAPTCHA Solution + Form Fields



SUCCESS, go to /success.php



8 Verify solution



From Here On...

Breaching the Client Side Trust

Server Side Attacks Attacking CAPTCHA Schemes with TesserCap


Let's Play Nice



Breaching the Client Side Trust




Hidden Fields, Client Side Storage and More





Hidden Fields, Client Side Storage and More





Arithmetic CAPTCHAs

Please answer this simple math question.

Post comment

What Is 6 + 4? (required)



Server Side Attacks



CAPTCHA Rainbow Tables Implementation Flaws

CAPTCHAs are not generated at runtime

Limited number of CAPTCHAs

CAPTCHAs are assigned static index values to be referenced for verification and assignment

Observations

- One of the most popular implementation
- Seen On very high traffic websites



CAPTCHA Rainbow TablesAttacking Static CAPTCHA Identifier

Numeric Identifier	CAPTCHA	Solution
0	95C7A	95C7A
1	58413	58413
2	9D3BF	9D3BF
3	49F1C	49F1C
4	ABB87	ABB87
99999	D498A	D498A



CAPTCHA Rainbow TablesAttacking Static CAPTCHA Identifier

Alphanumeric Identifier	CAPTCHA	Solution
uJSqsPvjxc6	95C7A	95C7A
9WzrowjPEqI	58413	58413
nm8SfvtEwpP	9D3BF	9D3BF
fespW5LVqNQ	49F1C	49F1C
dgLSB1CKJRJ	ABB87	ABB87
•••		
QmJF3TQazcH	D498A	D498A



CAPTCHA Rainbow Tables Attacking Dynamic CAPTCHA Identifiers

CAPTCHA MD5	САРТСНА	Solution
68ecb8867cd7457421c2eca3227bffbd	95C7A	95C7A
84a78d24bc9637fcfb152f723b6e8e27	58413	58413
84125db583d64c346d97a74fa9e53848	9D3BF	9D3BF
C6a1ed9477846568cdea62c97e389811	49F1C	49F1C
E9fa81f69debe45bded7bba4743a8a23	ABB87	ABB87
•••		
B9df819f6174d6577661e12859226366	D498A	D498A



CAPTCHA Rainbow Tables Dynamic Identifiers and Changing Images

Write your custom solvers!



Chosen CAPTCHA Identifier Attack

Client 1

GET /captcha.php + SESSIONID

Server 2

6

Pick a random CAPTCHA Identifier from finite set of

CAPTCHA

values

3

<html>

POST /verify.php + SESSIONID + Solution + Identifier

4

SUCCESS, go to next STEP

FAILURE, go to STEP 1

Use the Identifier to retrieve CAPTCHA solution +

Verify solution



CAPTCHA Fixation Attack

Client 1

GET /captcha.php + SESSIONID

Server₂

Pick a random CAPTCHA ID from finite set

of CAPTCHA

values

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily

Location: /get_captcha.php?id=captchalD

GET /get_captcha.php?id=captchaID + SESSIONID

4

CAPTCHA

6

(3)

< CAPTCHA Verification >



Set CAPTCHA
ID or solution
in HTTP
Session



CAPTCHA Fixation Attack

Client 1

GET /captcha.php + SESSIONID

Server₂

Pick a random CAPTCHA ID from finite set of CAPTCHA values

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily

Location: /get_captcha.php?id=captchalD

GET /get_captcha.php?id=evil_ID+ SESSIONID

4

CAPTCHA

6

3)

< CAPTCHA Verification >



Set CAPTCHA
ID and/or
solution in
HTTP Session



Persistent CAPTCHAs

Same CAPTCHA was returned for any number of registration attempts

CAPTCHAs can be brute-forced




CAPTCHA Re-Riding Attack

Client 1 Server (2 Create a GET /captcha.php + SESSIONID random CAPTCHA. 4) **CAPTCHA** Set CAPTCHA solution in **HTTP Session** POST /verify.php + SESSIONID + Solution Verify the **CAPTCHA** Several successful submits with Clear CAPTCHA a single solution state or SUCCESS, go to next STEP SESSION 8 FAILURE, go to STEP 1




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In Session CAPTCHA Brute-Force





OCR Assisted CAPTCHA Brute-Force





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OCR Assisted CAPTCHA Brute-Force

Solve CAPTCHA with an OCR

Bruteforce characters over the sample space


Continue.... Or better refresh SessionID for a new CAPTCHA!?



Attacking CAPTCHAs with TesserCap




The Victims




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The Weapon – TesserCap





TesserCap Introduction





TesserCap Demonstrations




Spatial Filters

	1	1	1
$\frac{1}{9}$ ×	1	1	1
	1	1	1

This Image: Digital Image Processing, Second Edition By Gonzalez and Woods



Spatial Filters in Action



a b c

FIGURE 3.36 (a) Image from the Hubble Space Telescope. (b) Image processed by a 15 × 15 averaging mask. (c) Result of thresholding (b). (Original image courtesy of NASA.)

This Image: Digital Image Processing, Second Edition By Gonzalez and Woods



TesserCap Results

CAPTCHA Provider	Accuracy
Captchas.net	40-50%
Opencaptcha.com	20-30%
Snaphost.com	60+%
Captchacreator.com	10-20%
www.phpcaptcha.org	10-20%
webspamprotect.com	40+%
ReCaptcha	0%



TesserCap Results

Website	Accuracy	Quantcast Rank
Wikipedia	20-30%	7
Ebay	20-30%	11
Reddit.com	20-30%	68
CNBC	50+%	121
Foodnetwork.com	80-90%	160
Dailymail.co.uk	30+%	245
Megaupload.com	80+%	1000
Pastebin.com	70-80%	32,534
Cavenue.com	80+%	149,645



Let's Play Nice a.k.a. Conclusion



A Secure CAPTCHA Implementation

Client 1

GET /captcha.php + *SESSIONID

Server 2 Create a new **SESSIONID

CAPTCHA + **SESSIONID

5)

POST /verify.php + SESSIONID + **Solution**

Set CAPTCH solution in **HTTP Session**

3 Create a new

CAPTCHA with **Random Text**

Verify the **CAPTCHA**

Clear CAPTCHA state or HTTP SESSION

SUCCESS, go to next STEP

9

FAILURE, Go to STEP 1



A Secure CAPTCHA Implementation

No client "influence on" or "knowledge about" the CAPTCHA content

Random with a large sample space

High on complexity to perform image preprocessing, segmentation and classification

The client should not have direct access to the CAPTCHA solution

No CAPTCHA reuse





Thank You!

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